Monday, 15 September 2014

The MCS Hoard

So here's an interesting thing about the Microgeneration Certification Scheme  (MCS)

The MCS is supposed to be self-funding, with fees applied on a 'per-registration' basis with these fees currently set at £15 per registration.  MCS installation companies also pay £110 annual fee, collected through the Certifying Body that accredits the installer.

Gemserv administers the scheme, and its latest annual report show that MCS has a surplus of £6.6m at the end of March 2014.



Indeed, the surplus grew in the most recent financial year by £1.3m, so this is not purely an artefact of the dash for PV of late 2011.

Figures for the number of installations the registered on the scheme database are available from the MCS website and show this:

 
 
So there were 122 thousand installations in the same period that the scheme ran a £1.3m surplus, corresponding to £10.65 of surplus per installation.
 
 
All this begs the question, why?  Why is the scheme building up such a large surplus, when its terms of reference are to be no more than self-financing?  What's all this money for?  How does MCS anticipate spending it within its terms of reference?
 
I'm personally not against accumulating some money from each installation if it's spent for the good of the whole industry, but just saving it up for a rainy day?  What use is that to anyone?
 
How would you spend it if you were in charge of the MCS?  Would you just lower the registration fee, or would you be happy to keep paying the extra, were the money to be spent on something useful.  Write in the comments below...
 
 
 
 
 


Saturday, 23 August 2014

Is RHI More Trouble than it’s Worth?



To get support from the domestic Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI), there are some hoops it’s necessary to go through, but how much do these add to the cost of a solar thermal installation?


If you install a solar thermal system in the UK you can receive financial help from the government’s Domestic Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI).  RHI payments vary depending on factors such as the size of the solar panels, their location and orientation and especially the hot water demand of the house (which is taken from the number of people who live there).  It can be worth between £1,500 and £3,500, paid out over the first seven years.  In addition to the payments householders also benefit from savings on energy bills, the value of which are much higher the RHI payments over the long life of the solar heating system.

In order to qualify for the RHI, the solar panels must be of a certain quality - achieving accreditation with the Microgeneration Certification Scheme (MCS) or SolarKeymark, the installation company must also be MCS accredited and the household needs to demonstrate that it has taken straightforward energy efficiency measures such as insulating the loft and filling cavity walls (where there are cavity walls to fill).  The way that this last requirement is proven is to produce a Green Deal Advice Report that doesn’t show loft insulation or cavity wall insulation as a recommended measure.

In recent weeks it has come to light that some solar installation companies are advising customers that there’s so much cost and bureaucracy associated with installing a solar thermal system that qualifies for the domestic RHI that they are better off avoiding the scheme.

Let’s have a look at whether this argument stacks up.

Extra Costs for the Installation



Let’s assume that the installation is of identical quality both with and without the RHI.  The installer cuts no corners on the installation standard and that the equipment that is used is registered with the MCS or Solarkeymark.

The installer must log the installation onto the online MCS database for the customer to be able to claim the RHI. There is a charge from MCS of £15 to do this.  Let’s add £20 to that to pay for the time for someone to fill out the online forms.  Total £35

In addition, the household needs to pay a Green Deal Assessor to visit and produce the Green Deal report.  You don’t need to undertake any of the recommended measures unless they include loft insulation or cavity wall insulation.  The report costs between £150 and £250. 

So the total Variable Costs (cost per installation) are between £185 and £285

Annual Costs for the Installer



For an installer to be MCS accredited, there are annual fees to pay and administrative time required.  Let’s take a look at the costs for a smaller company, as it is generally thought that the burden is highest for these.

The solar installer must pay a fee to join the scheme and be audited each year.  For a solar installer with less than 10 employees the MCS annual registration and audit fee comes in at around £470 (see NAPIT fee sheet). 

In addition there is an MCS requirement that the solar installation company must be a member of an approved renewable energy consumer protection code.  Joining RECC depends on the number of staff, but for 1-6 employees it’s £250/year. 

Let’s assume the company wouldn’t operate a formal quality system if it wasn’t going to be MCS accredited and add £1,000 of admin time to these figures to pay an office administrator to maintain the paperwork that the scheme requires each year and make sure the document handover packs and quotes remain compliant with the scheme.

Both the fees and overhead costs fall (per technology) if the company installs other MCS renewable energy technologies as well as solar thermal, but let’s assume it doesn’t.

For this small company then, the total annual Fixed Costs of maintaining an MCS solar installer registration is £1,720.   


Total Cost



The total additional cost per installation of being RHI compliant is found by dividing the Fixed Cost by the number of installations the company does each year and adding this to the Variable Cost per installation.

This is where the costs of accreditation can start to look very high – it depends enormously on how many installations the installer does each year.  See the table below.



How the admin costs of an RHI compliant solar system varies with the number of installations
the installation company does each year


If the installer does only one or two solar installations a year then, yes the costs of RHI compliance is high compared to the benefit in claiming the RHI, but even at only one system a month the extra costs start to become really quite small compared to the RHI payments. 

The more installations that the company can do each year, the more the costs trends down towards the cost of the Green Deal Report.   Nor will every customer see this as a valueless piece of paper; some may value the guidance on further measures they could take to improve their energy efficiency.

The problem for the RHI is that until the scheme starts to drive demand for a reasonable number of installations, then for small companies that perhaps combine general plumbing with a very occasional solar installation the barrier costs of being MCS registered don’t look worthwhile. 

An excellent time to encourage a customer to consider solar heating is at the same time that a hot water cylinder is being replaced, but the plumbing company standing in front of the customer won’t offer this option if it isn’t MCS registered  If they do offer solar they might encourage the customer to ignore the RHI.  This is, of course, a classic chicken/egg situation.  Unless this plumbing company starts to offer more customers solar under the RHI, they’ll never see enough demand to justify MCS accreditation.

It would be good if there was a way to encourage this plumber to promote solar thermal to customers, perhaps in cooperation with a local accredited solar installer.  For any installation company that’s doing more than a handful of solar thermal installations each year, the cost of the RHI requirements are small relative to the RHI payments.


However this is not to say that MCS couldn’t do something to reduce the burden on smaller installers to meet the ever-increasing demands of the scheme.

Friday, 22 August 2014

May Cause Side Effects


Solar Anti-dumping's Unforeseen Consequences


The ineffective fudge that came too late for solar module manufacturers is now poised to kill off the European inverter manufacturing industry

As predicted by many, the antidumping measures on Chinese solar modules brought in by the European Union have proved rather too easily circumnavigated.  I've heard of a number of approaches to evasion since the minimum price agreement was reached, but the most recent I've heard about should have Brussels Eurocrats in a cold sweat.

A Flag of Convenience?

I guess the most obvious sign of AD avoidance is the flood of Malaysian solar panels that are now prevalent at the low end of the market.  Many, including myself, strongly suspect that there's far more Malaysian modules being sold than there is manufacturing capacity in Malaysia. The obvious conclusion is that product is being trans-shipped from China via Malaysia and arrives in Europe with  paperwork to prove it's not of Chinese origin.

Some companies try harder than others to maintain the pretence that they have a factory in Malaysia. One company that approached us has gone to the trouble of making a Malaysian website (suspiciously similar to a Chinese manufacturer's and with all the same photos). It was only when we asked to visit the Malaysian factory that we were told that it wasn't company policy to allow visits, and that it was a 'quiet time' anyway so there wasn't anything to see.

Others are less circumspect about what they're doing. Take a look at this email I received offering to illegally rebadge Chinese modules as Malaysian with "all paperwork":

 
Dear value customer,

Nice to meet you!

Yes, for said product, here we would like to provide the professional trading solution to avoid the high anti-dumping duty that imports from China.

The routine for the containers will be as:

CHINA ---> MALAYSIA(change the containers in the free zone or inland warehouse) ----> England

Document issued details:
a. Malaysia solar panels factory CO
b. Master bill of loading under Malaysia factory
c. Malaysia factory packing list
d. Malaysia factory invoice

And the cost is much favor, it will save a lot of the anti- dumping tax:
1. Ocean freight from China port to Port Klang (west): to be advised
2. All in fee in Malaysia:
a. Include all the local fee for changing containers in Malaysia;
b. Include the above Malaysia factory document fee;
3. Ocean freight from Port Klang to England: to be advised

If you are intrested in such trading solution, kindly pls feel free to contact us anytime.
We have many successful cases to England for this item and other items.

Tks a lot.

Marketing Support

Another ruse is for the Chinese supplier to charge you the full minimum price and then separately remit money back to you against an invoice for "Marketing Support" or "Consultancy". The first invoice less the marketing support is the true price for the modules, but the only paperwork customs and excise sees is the first invoice at the minimum price.

My company has been approached with this offer on numerous occasions.

While this clearly isn't in line with the spirit of the AD legislation, I'm also not sure whether it would be strictly illegal.  After all, what's wrong with a manufacturer offering to part fund marketing initiatives in an export market?  Perhaps we'll see a test case soon?  Then again, perhaps we won't. Having brought in the rules, we've seen little evidence that the Commission has the stomach for the hard graft of enforcement.

Inverter Cross-Subsidy

I only heard about this approach recently, but if it becomes widespread it has the potential to wreak havoc upon European inverter manufacturers.

The way it works is that a Chinese module manufacturer agrees a price below the price undertaking level with you.  It then invoices you at the price  undertaking level and transfers the difference as a payment to an inverter manufacturer up the road. This payment is obviously invisible to EU customs, which only sees the modules being bought at the right price. The inverter manufacturer then sells you a shipment of inverters at a knock-down price (but not too low to be suspicious), with the price subsidised by the 'overpayment' for the modules.

The Antidumping decision came too late for the many, many European manufacturers of modules already in liquidation after years of fierce competition from Chinese competitors, but at least the continent still has world leading inverter manufacturers.

But for how long under the current regime?  SMA is already laying off staff and issuing profit warnings to investors blaming a lessening demand for solar in Europe.   How ironic if the policy intended to protect European solar manufacturing ends up contributing to the destruction of its manufacturers of solar inverters and Chinese dominance of this product segment in addition to solar modules.

The commission should either crack on with enforcing their price undertaking agreement with gusto, or should put the whole thing out of its misery and let Europeans benefit from world pricing on PV modules.  The current situation helps no one.

Thursday, 24 July 2014

Short of the Mark?


If you’re relying on a Solar Keymark wind resistance it turns out that there are large parts of the UK where you shouldn’t install








Viridian Solar has recently launched the latest version of its wind load calculator to partnered solar installers.  The calculator has been updated to take into account new guidance in the latest version of BRE digest DG 489 “Wind loads on roof –mounted photovoltaic and solar thermal systems”.

Read my blog on the changes to DG 489 here.

I thought I’d take the calculator for a test-drive, and decided to use it to try to answer the question “Is the Solar Keymark wind resistance test to 1,000 Pa adequate for the UK?”
The Keymark requires solar thermal panels to be tested for wind resistance, but historically it was a pass-fail test set at 1,000Pa (100 kg/ m2).    With the recent introduction of the new standard for solar thermal panels (ISO 9806), Keymark testing will require a pass-fail test at 2,400 Pa (putting it more in line with the level required for solar PV panels in EN61215).
 
However, the vast majority of solar panels currently on the Keymark and MCS database have been tested to the old standard EN12-975 at 1,000Pa.  While it is possible for the manufacturer to request that the test continues beyond the minimum, most are content to achieve the ‘gold standard’ of Keymark.


So how well does a single test to 1,000Pa cover us in the UK? 

In assessing that a structure has sufficient resistance to wind, Eurocode 1 requires you to apply a partial safety factor to the tested strength.  The safety factor you choose depends on how the solar panel fails.  For example a solar panel that has its failure in a metal component has a lower safety factor (divide by 1.1) than one where the failure is in wood (divide by 1.44).  This is to take into account the natural variability in the strength of wood and the consistency in the strength of steel. 

Since Keymark doesn’t require a test to find the failure level, there’s no way of knowing if the panel would have failed at 1,001Pa or would have gone on to 5,000Pa.  You also don’t know what the failure mode would have been.  Unless the manufacturer has tested beyond 1,000Pa the only safe assumption is to use 1,000Pa and, if they haven’t tested to confirm the failure mode, to reduce this by the highest partial safety factor of 1.44 for failure in a timber fixing.

Consequently, to be in compliance with UK Building Regulations and MCS, a panel tested to only 1,000Pa should not be used if the calculated wind pressure is higher than 694Pa, being 1,000Pa divided by 1.44.

I ran the wind calculator for the common situation of a two storey building with a duo-pitch roof at various wind speeds.  I assumed that flat plate solar panels are fixed above the roof in a position to avoid the edge-zones (which have higher wind loads), that the building location was 75m in altitude and relatively close to but not right on the sea (2-20km) and that there were no special topographical features (the building is not on a hillside).

It turns out that it’s really rather easy in the UK to achieve wind speeds that produce uplift pressures exceeding those for Keymark tested products.  The table below shows the calculated wind pressure (including partial safety factor) and the map summarises the results.




Some solar manufacturers will to tell you to just put a few extra fixings on if the winds are high.  A few moment's consideration reveal this is completely inadequate.  If you haven’t tested to failure, you cannot know that the fixings are the weakest part.  It could just as easily be the cover glass that comes away at 1,001 Pa.

The only installation that meets building regulations and therefore the requirements of the MCS installation standards is one that uses solar panels and fixing kits that have been tested to a level that exceeds the wind pressure.

It is a welcome development that the new test method in ISO9806 is to 2,400Pa, though it is regrettable that the authors of the standard did not take the opportunity to resolve other shortcomings of the wind pressure test that I have written about before.
 
I don't anticipate that many products will struggle to achieve this higher pressure level, after all people have been installing all over the UK for years.  The fact remains that until they’ve been re-tested to a higher wind pressure there will be many locations in the UK where the Keymark alone falls short of the mark as far as building regulations are concerned.  The responsibility is clearly with solar installers to use solar panels with a tested pressure resistance high enough for the location.

Thursday, 10 July 2014

The Allowable Solutions Puppet Show



In a recent article Stephen Williams, a Lib Dem government minister at the Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG), was reported to have protested that as far as the government's Zero Carbon Homes Policy was concerned:

"There is a view out there that we have "watered down" our ambitions, or that we are merely "puppets" of the development industry. These views are outdated and blinkered."

Unfortunately for Mr Williams, a recent consultation response published by his department seriously undermines these claims.

The Zero Carbon Hub is an independent body created by the government to help define and deliver the Zero Carbon Homes policy.  After gathering evidence and consulting with the construction industry the Hub proposed that Zero Carbon Homes policy should be broken down into three requirements for new homes and proposed levels for each:

1. A minimum level of thermal insulation (called Fabric Efficiency)
2. A maximum level of carbon dioxide emissions from the house itself (called Carbon Compliance)
3. The balance of carbon emissions to be 'offset' through carbon dioxide reducing measures paid for elsewhere (called Allowable Solutions)

Fabric efficiency means building cosy, draught-free homes, this level was set just a little beyond current (2013) building regulations.

Carbon compliance could be achieved by pushing the insulation further (towards passivhaus level), or by installing renewable energy equipment on the homes such as photovoltaic (PV) panels, solar water heating or heat pumps.

Allowable Solutions was intended to help get difficult buildings over the line, and could account for around 30% of the improvement.  It would involve the developer paying into a fund that delivered energy measures off-site (perhaps like building wind farms or energy upgrades of existing homes).  It was suggested that the price of the offsets should be set at a level that would encourage developers to achieve as much as possible through improvements to the actual homes being built.

DCLG's Allowable Solutions consultation contained a question (Question 1) asking whether the Zero Carbon Hub proposal should be taken forward, and the results were recently revealed in the consultation response.

Fully seventy percent of consultation respondents (93 responses) supported the Hub's proposal.  Of the thirty percent that did not, many argued that even higher levels of energy efficiency should be required due to advances in insulation and renewable energy technologies.

By contrast a majority of developers, (14 out of the 22 responses from developers) did not agree with the Hub's proposals and wanted lower standards of energy efficiency for new homes, and more of the carbon emissions to be deemed as 'offset' through the Allowable Solutions mechanism.

So what did DCLG decide? 

It went with the developers.  The current proposal completely drops the carbon compliance requirement and allows developers to build homes little improved over those built today. 

DCLG ignored a clear majority in the consultation and it ignored the advice of the independent organisation it had created to help it deliver this policy.

According to the Minister, it is outdated and blinkered to think him a mere "puppet" of the development industry. 

Make your own mind up.

Saturday, 14 June 2014

Picking Through The Wreckage of Zero Carbon Homes

The policy that categorically does not do what it says on the tin




It all started out so well in those early years.  There was a sense of shared endeavour in the construction industry.  When, in 2006, the government announced that by 2016 all homes built in the UK would have zero net carbon emissions, no one thought it would be easy, but many in the industry were eager to rise to this inspirational challenge.

The concept was that we should stop building new homes that would only need to be upgraded later to be properly energy efficient. Building these homes fit for the future would stimulate a mass-market for energy efficiency measures and renewable energy technologies and result in tradespeople and designers developing skills that could be carried over into the upgrade of our existing stock of buildings.

Well, here we are in 2014 and how has it fared?

In the run up to the Queen’s Speech, Stephen Williams, a Liberal Democrat MP and minister at the Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG), began briefing via the Lib Dem website that he’d ‘saved’ the Zero Carbon Homes (ZCH) policy from those nasty Tories.

From information in his article its possible to piece together how ZCH will work.  So let's peer through the smoke drifting around and have a look at the train wreck we’re left with.

It seems like all housing developers will have to build homes that are equivalent to the Code for Sustainable Homes level 4, which is only a 44% improvement on the so-called regulated carbon emissions of a 2006 home.

However, even this overstates the ‘achievement’.  As I have covered before in this blog, the definition of zero has been adjusted to include only regulated carbon emissions (those from heating and hard-wired lighting).  All energy used by plug in electrical appliances (white goods, gadgets, audio-visual) have been removed from consideration.

Add back in the average emissions from plug in electrical appliances and the picture is even less flattering.  The original vision of Zero Carbon Homes has been diluted to such an extent that the achievement of which Stephen Williams is so proud is that a home built in 2016 will be allowed to produce fully 71% of the carbon emissions of a home built in 2006.

The average energy bill for one of these ‘Zero Carbon’ homes will be similarly unimpressive.  I calculate that a 3 bed semi-detached ‘Zero Carbon’ home would have a combined energy bill of £800/year whereas one built to 2006 standards would have a combined energy bill of £1080/year.

The political sleight of hand that Mr Williams is using to justify his hyperbole was announced in the Queen’s Speech and is the creation of legislation to enable an element of ZCH called ‘Allowable Solutions’.   This could be better called ‘Buying Carbon Offsets’ because it means that instead of pushing the performance of the building itself from Code level 4 to Code level 5 (zero regulated carbon emissions), the developer can choose instead to pay into a government-managed fund.  What this fund will be used for is, as yet, undefined, but seems likely to be spent on upgrading existing buildings.

Allowable Solutions was first proposed as a means of helping more challenging homes (for example flats with limited roof area) make it over the line by allowing carbon offsetting for that difficult last little bit.  What was supposed to be the mint chocolate with the coffees has now become the main course of the meal, potentially accounting for 56% of the regulated emissions.

The circularity of this is mind-bending.  Instead of building efficient homes in the first place, we effectively collect a tax from the developer, leaving the house-buyer with largely unchanged energy bills and putting the money into a pot which may or may not at some unspecified future point be used to improve existing buildings.

The opportunities for double-counting the benefits are also clear.  It's hard to imagine ministers avoiding the temptation to take credit for both the new homes being zero carbon and for whatever measures the fund is spent on at the same time.

Furthermore, there is to be a provision for ‘small developments’ to be exempt from reaching Code 5.  Again, it is not yet clear what small means in this context, but Barbour ABI has estimated that if small means a development of 10 or more homes then around 10% of new homes would be exempted from the policy, whereas if developments of up to 50 homes were to be considered small, then this figure would be around a third of new homes.

Which Tin?


In his article, Stephen Williams says that Zero Carbon Homes “does exactly what it says on the tin”

This astonishing claim doesn’t even get close to passing the ‘reasonable person’ test.  Someone offered a home described as Zero Carbon would have a reasonable expectation that the carbon emissions from the home would be zero and energy bills would be extremely low.

After ten years of backtracking, what we’ve actually got is a policy where new homes will produce more than 70% of the emissions they started with, coupled to a carbon-tax that might apply to only 2/3 of new homes built, and energy bills for the house-holder reduced by only 30%.

This policy "does exactly what it says on the tin" only as long as the tin in question is labelled "Business as Usual for Property Developers"

DCLG has succumbed to the enticingly simple argument that a proper ZCH policy would impose higher costs on developers and slow the rate of new build, thus threatening the economic recovery. The reason this argument is bogus is that if build costs rise, then the price a property developer would be willing to pay for land will drop.  Building to higher standards simply reduces the wind-fall to the land owner.  The only time the burden of building to a higher performance falls to developers is when they have speculated that legislation will be watered down and over-paid for their land bank.

It is not clear that this “world-leading” policy even meets the wooly definition of the European Directive on the Energy Performance of Buildings that the UK must comply with by 2020.  This requires all housing to be ‘nearly zero carbon’.  It may be that this is tested in the European Commission, indeed a number of renewable energy associations are already considering just such a move.

All is not Lost


A properly designed structure for the Allowable Solutions might just get this train back on the rails.  The price per tonne of carbon should be set to encourage the use of now common on-site measures such as higher levels of thermal insulation, heat pumps, solar water heating and solar PV.

One opportunity would be to set the price per tonne in a tiered structure, with an increasing marginal cost.



Code 4 is a 44% reduction in the emissions compared to a 2006 home, leaving 56% emissions available to offset under Allowable Solutions.  What if the chunk from 44% to 72% was priced at £120 a tonne, and the chunk between 72% and 100% was priced at £30 a tonne. Developers would have a strong incentive to drive efficiency up towards the 72% level (broadly equivalent to the old 'carbon compliance' level) using improvements to the building.

A developer who built to business as usual (Code 4) and paid the entire carbon offset would have an average cost to bear of £75/tonne.  By contrast a developer that improved insulation levels or installed renewable energy on the homes to bring down emissions below 28% of 2006 levels could reduce their average cost of carbon offsets down to £30/tonne.

A policy designed like this would be responsive to a changing market. If the housing market continued to improve and government decided that landowners could bear more of the costs of the policy, then the relative width of the bands could be adjusted.

Come on Mr Williams, all is not yet lost. You've still got time to make the reality of Zero Carbon Homes match your rhetoric.

Tuesday, 3 June 2014

Slow Burner - how will the Domestic RHI Take off?

How much can the first year of the Feed in Tariff tell us about uptake for the Domestic RHI


How it went for the Feed in Tariff



A number of people (including the solarblogger himself) tried to temper expectations for the domestic RHI with the argument that the Feed in Tariff (FIT) took a bit of time to get going. The logic goes that it takes time for the public to become aware, for installers to work out how to market it, and especially for housing associations to get organised. 

I thought I'd take a look at the numbers to check whether they supported this idea. 

I wanted to compare the take up of PV in domestic installations before and after the introduction of the FIT. There is a wealth of data available from the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) on the levels of PV deployment  under the FIT, but much less for the years preceding it. I relied upon this report on the Low Carbon Building Programme (LCBP) to build a picture of deployment rates before the FIT. 

Under LCBP phase 1 (the domestic stream) there were 4,428 installations of PV. The average size was 2.18kWp, for a total capacity installed under the scheme of 9.7MWp. 

Since the report doesn't disclose the deployment in each period, I estimated PV deployment based on overall scheme expenditure.  I then combined this with FIT data for systems below 4kWp, most of which is likely to be domestic. 

The results are very interesting. 

When you look at the plot of the overall data, it sure does seem that all the action started in year two of the scheme. But this is a trick of exponential growth. Look at the lower plot, where I have shown the data only up to the end of year one. The first year was spectacular. 

The level of deployment grew from round 700 installations a quarter before the FIT to 11,000 a quarter at the end of the first year. Before the FIT subsidy, solar thermal systems were being installed at a rate around 10 times higher than solar PV. By the end of the first year, solar thermal had declined slightly, but solar PV installations outnumbered them by almost double. 

And so to the Domestic Renewable Heat Incentive


There are a number of reasons why the domestic Renewable Heat Incentive won't take off like the Feed in Tariff did. 

1.  The Feed in Tariff.  

When the FIT was launched it was the only show in town. The grant scheme for renewable heat was derisory by comparison. As the domestic RHI launches, people interested in investing in their homes to reduce energy bills have the choice of both FIT and (I suppose) the Green Deal. 

2.  Installation complexity. 

With the exception of solar thermal, all the domestic RHI technologies replace an existing heating system, rather than being an add-on. People will be more cautious about installing a new technology when they worry that the impact of it not working is a cold house and no hot water.

Renewable heating installations are generally more intrusive too. A heat pump may require the replacement of radiators to cope with lower heating temperatures, biomass boilers can require a lot of space. New products such as this one which simplifies the installation of solar thermal to levels approaching that for solar PV may help overcome this barrier, at least for solar thermal where there's always the backup heater. 

3. Off Grid Target Market

The domestic RHI tariff levels were intended to stimulate a market in the 20% of homes that are off the gas grid. For sure, the returns are better when heating with oil or electricity, but returns for solar thermal on gas can also be good, as this analysis has shown. 

4. World First

The UK feed in Tariff followed the implementation of similar schemes in other european countries. Businesses could see the rapid take up of markets that had resulted and anticipating a similar trajectory for the UK, were pumped and ready once the scheme launched. By contrast the RHI this a genuine worlds first. There's no equivalent to look at to predict uptake. The many, many false starts for the scheme also didn't help. Many installation companies I spoke to weren't even willing to spend time thinking about it until they were absolutely sure it had launched. 

5. The Feed in Tariff (again)

My final reason is perhaps the most important. The way the government managed the Feed in Tariff has led to the widespread belief that as soon as any renewable energy scheme is successful it will be ruthlessly hacked back. The shadow that the treatment of the FIT scheme casts is long and pervasive. 

For all this, the scheme offers a level of financial support beyond anything that renewable heating technologies have benefitted from before. My plea to the industry is to give it a while before judging the success or otherwise of the scheme. 

It may take time to take some time to warm up, but warm up it surely will.